Il controllo sui contratti asimmetrici nel diritto privato europeo. Armonizzazione delle tecniche ed economia dei rapporti di consumo.

The thesis focuses on the policy implications behind the judicial review in consumer contracts under the Dir. 93/13/EEC, especially on the core terms. It tries to provide an original justification according to the point of view of Law and Economics, enhancing the importance of the Information Economy’s insights, without neglecting the concerns of the more political freedom of contract’s theories. The research argues that consumer apathy encourages professional parties to offer different prices. This leads to price dispersion up to the point that certain clauses are offered on terms corresponding to those of the monopoly. An autonomous definition of good faith valid for European private law is then proposed: a given clause is in accordance with good faith as long as an entrepreneur could have offered it in conditions of competition. The thesis claims that the ECJ is wrong to be sceptical of allowing the national judge to reduce the unfair clause or fill the contract after it is declared partially void due to unfairness. The judicial review is actually designed to deliver the best adjudication in the particular case. Every alternative use may contradict its aim and clash with the fact that res judicata is not able to affect supplier conducts beyond the contracting parties. After all, private law is only a suboptimal instrument for cleansing the market of unfair standard terms, and yet it is being used as such.