Listing Price and Non-Price-Taking behavior in market mechanisms with differential information

Abstract 1 This work investigates the optimal initial public offering mechanism (IPO) comparing the book-building, the fixed price offer and the auction to understand if the supremacy of the first mechanism is economically justified or if there are other motivations behind. In the first chapter, a survey of the theories concerning the underpricing and a general overview of the market evolution are presented. Later, let us present a theoretical model in which the listing methods are compared basis on the firm’s profit. It examines what are the key variables studied by the issuer to decide the mechanism maximizing its revenue. The information cost and the reservation utility of the investors turn out the most significant variables. Abstract 2 This work considers an exchange economy with a finite number of agents and a finite number of goods where the agents are arbitragers. The general equilibrium theory borrows the notion of arbitrage to the finance for showing how the consumers move in an economy closer to the real world with uncertainty and differential information. The first chapter describes the notion of arbitrage, its evolution during the years through the eyes of several authors. The second chapter analyses the main aspects of a differential information economy, studying the concept of core and competitive equilibrium in the ex-ante, in the interim and in the ex-post stage. In the last chapter, the arbitrage condition becomes the guideline for defining new notions of competitive equilibrium when the economy is characterized by uncertainty and differential information.