Peirce's Account of Purposefulness: A 'Methodeutical' Principle

The dissertation investigates how Charles S. Peirce deals with teleological tendencies in thought. I argue that Peirce’s account of human purposefulness in thinking is first of all heuristic. Purposefulness is thus a principle that enables us to acquire new knowledge and apply past knowledge to new situations. As such, it guides us toward a systematization of our experience and knowledge. Peirce approaches these themes in his ‘methodeutic’ and in his esthetics. I read these disciplines in light of Immanuel Kant’s regulative principles. Peirce’s treatment of purposefulness is thus shown to be in continuity with Kant. However, many differences will be indicated as well, first of all: the different ways in which they consider metaphysics. Eventually, purposefulness is revealed to be far more important for Peirce. To finish, I use Kant’s own writings to develop an account of transcendental philosophy which is not foundational, or anti-skeptical. In this fashion, transcendental philosophy can coexist with fallibilism and so be applicable to Peirce’s philosophy and pragmatism.