The constitutional implications of the paradigm shift in the European budgetary galaxy after Covid-19 and the war in Ukraine

This dissertation explores the transformation of the EU budget following Covid-19 and the war in Ukraine. Following the pandemic, the EU adopted unprecedented programmes financed with a joint debt of significant size. This PhD dissertation argues that such novelties brought a paradigm shift in the European budgetary galaxy. The most relevant shift attains the issuance of debt to finance the EU’s expenditure, which, despite the many reassurances offered by the EU institutions to be merely temporary, is likely to affect the EU financial architecture permanently. This dissertation examines the legal construction of the new budgetary instruments, such as SURE, NextGenerationEU, RepowerEU and the assistance mechanism offered to Ukraine and investigates the constitutional consequences of the novel budget paradigm. It shows that key principles of the EU financial constitution are impacted, such as the principle of budgetary balance, unity, and integrity of own resources system, and suggests their evolutionary interpretations. It also illustrates how the new legal construction, which extensively relies on externally assigned revenues and is placed outside the standard budget, affects the budgetary powers of the EU institutions. Especially the European Parliament in its role of budgetary authority is bypassed. This architecture is critically discussed and risks concerning the principle of representative democracy, legitimacy, transparency and accountability are highlighted. In this respect, suggestions for reforms are appraised. The transformation of the EU finances also attains the Cohesion policy domain which, as this dissertation demonstrates, is expanded. Moreover, it is argued that the EU budget is nowadays provided with a new regulatory function that allows the EU indirectly to advance its policy priorities.