Machina delinquere potest?

Today's astonishing development of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) has marked the onset of a new era characterized by profound societal and legal changes. Among the numerous groundbreaking developments, Artificial Intelligence (AI) has emerged as a pivotal force, penetrating virtually every aspect of our daily existence. From the domains of commerce and industry to healthcare, transportation and entertainment, AI technologies have become indispensable instruments shaping our interactions, professions, and our way of navigating the world. With its extraordinary capabilities and ever-expanding influence, AI serves as a testament to humanity's unwavering commitment to innovation and the limitless potential of technology to transform our society. While Artificial Intelligence systems can execute actions akin to those that could constitute criminal activities if carried out by humans, the challenge arises from the fact that crimes are typically defined within the framework of established laws. Consequently, it can be quite challenging to classify such AI-induced actions as criminal due to the absence of specific legal provisions. Nevertheless, criminal acts are characterized by the intent - or mens rea - behind it. In this context, the intricate issue of assigning criminal responsibility to AI, being a non-human entity, presents particularly complex theoretical challenges, above all its punishment. This dissertation aims to: define AI and its interactions with criminal law, review the current legislation and doctrine, briefly reconstruct potential liability models for AI, deconstruct the aim of punishment in modern constitutional systems, and evaluate whether modern legal systems allow machines to be punished.