El concepto de dignidad en Kant. Análisis del debate interpretativo y sus implicaciones para la noción de autonomía en bioética

The general objective of this research is to offer a systematic study of the concept of dignity in Kant’s work. The aim of this study is twofold: first, to determine the relevance and specific role that this concept plays within Kantian ethics—that is, to clarify how Kant himself understood dignity; second, to examine in depth the ways in which Kantian dignity has been received and interpreted in contemporary thought. The content of this research can be divided into two major sections: one theoretical in nature and the other focused on practical matters. The theoretical section, comprising the first three chapters, is devoted to analyzing the conceptual content of Kantian dignity. Each chapter represents a stage in that analysis. Chapter One addresses Kant’s own treatment of the concept in his work. First, a brief introductory historical overview of the development of the notion of dignity in the Western world is offered. Secondly, an explanation about the ways in which Kant uses the term “dignity” (in German Würde) within his texts; special attention is paid to the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and the Metaphysics of Morals. Chapter Two focuses on the study of the various interpretations that Kantian dignity has received, primarily centered around the debate developed in recent years. It is possible to speak of two major interpretive camps in this debate, which we refer to here as conventionalists and revisionists. The discussion is structured around four major questions: (1) whether dignity is or is not a central concept in Kantian ethics; (2) the relationship between Kantian dignity and the contemporary doctrine of human rights; (3) the connection between dignity and other fundamental concepts of Kantian ethics, specifically autonomy and the categorical imperative; and (4) how dignity is attributed to the moral law and to the person. Chapter Three constitutes the propositional part of this research and is dedicated to assessing and reorganizing elements of Kantian ethics that may help answer the questions left open by Kant himself and by the interpretive debate. The main questions are referred to the definition of “absolute inner value”, as well as how the expression “metaphysical property” should be interpreted within Kantian ethics. The practical section, represented by the final chapter, as name suggests, seeks to derive some implications that the results from the previous section could have on concrete practical issues; in this case, the focus was on the field of bioethics and the question whether all human beings are persons and why. Due to this organization, the first section can be considered an independent unit, while the reading and understanding of the second section largely depend on the first, as it is based on several of the elements discussed there. This does not mean that the final chapter functions as a mere addition with no theoretical relevance. On the contrary, the discussion developed there allowed for a deeper exploration of key concepts for understanding Kantian dignity and autonomy, such as the notions of capacity, nature, and homo noumenon. Similarly, these issues help to show the scope that Kantian ethics can have in real-life situations and current problems that have serious consequences for people’s lives; thus, fulfilling one of the major objectives set at the beginning of the research.