Jura seu instituta: Law as institution in Spinoza

One of the most underdeveloped aspects in the interpretation of Spinoza’s political thought is his understanding of the law. This shortcoming relates to Spinoza’s reputation as an anti-juridical thinker, given the equation he establishes between right and power (jus sive potentia), which excludes the possibility of a transcendental grounding of a normative sphere of rights and obligations. This in turn explains the seeming absence of a systematic reflection on the nature of the law in Spinoza’s works—at least, that is, one that is in line with the natural law tradition, whether in its classical or in its modern configuration. Indeed, as established in recent literature, Spinoza’s equation between right and power entails not so much a complete deflation of the juridical sphere as an alternative, immanent and materialist, conceptualization of the essence of the law. Nevertheless, the nature of this alternative conceptualization remains somewhat elusive given the difficulty of placing it within the dilemma between normativism and voluntarism that has seemingly defined the juridical landscape of modernity. Only seemingly, however, for when trying to place Spinoza’s conception of the law within the history of its modern conceptualization, interpreters have until now ignored the existence of a third alternative tradition within modern and contemporary philosophy of law: that of legal institutionalism, according to which the essence of the law is captured neither by norms nor by decisions but by institutions as the primary means for the socio-juridical organization of collective existence and action. The primary purpose of this thesis is to show that Spinoza’s alternative, i.e., immanent and materialist, conception of the law is best served by placing it within this institutionalist tradition. In this sense, the central claim of this thesis is that Spinoza’s study of politics hinges directly on a conception of the essence of the law as the complex and dynamic process through which a multiplicity of human beings effectively and continuously come to adopt a common ratio vivendi or practice of living. As captured by the formula jura seu instituta, and as required by his metaphysics and his affect-centered theory of action, Spinoza conceives the law as institution: both in the sense that the law is essentially an instituent process and that such process is primarily carried out through institutions.