Essays in Political Economics and Voting Behavior

This dissertation consists of two papers. The first paper ``Do Electoral Systems Affect the Incumbent Probability of Re-election? Evidence from Italian Municipalities'' empirically investigates how electoral systems affect the incumbent likelihood of re-election in Italian municipalities. It also sheds light on the mechanism through which the electoral system affects the re-election probability. The overarching goal of the paper is to connect different aspects of the issue. I provide new insight into how different electoral systems affect accountability, politician selection and then economic policies. Results show that the probability of re-election is significantly higher in majoritarian systems for mayors but not for assessors and councillors. The majoritarian system defines a clear majority within the city council and its leader, which increases accountability toward the mayors. Indeed, in the majoritarian systems, the effort of mayors, measured as the probability of having a social welfare investment, is higher. Finally, We show that the observed evidence is not driven by political selection. The second paper ``Separated Under the Same Roof: Fiscal Inefficiency of Parties' Fragmentation and Mayor's Political Power" investigates the effect of political fragmentation of local government on fiscal policies. It shows that the effect of fragmentation on fiscal policies depends mainly on two factors: the presence of a binding budget constraint and the political power of the executive leader. Results show that, in the presence of a binding budget constraint, a more fragmented majority performs less public spending and collects less revenue. Moreover, we show that the negative effect of political fragmentation disappears while the political power of the mayor increases.