La clausola della nazione pi๠favorita dalle convenzioni internazionali all'ordinamento europeo

The main goal of this thesis is to demonstrate how the connections between different juridical levels in the relationship between Member States of the European Union requires a systematic interpretation of the intra-EU double tax conventions, in particular the obligation of the most-favoured-nation treatment. The starting point is a dualistic interpretation of the non-discrimination principle; considered both as an obligation of equal treatment on the national level and an application of the most-favoured-nation clause. These principles are investigated in the context of intra-EU relationships and furthermore in the light of the main objective of the EU, i.e. to build an Internal Market. The analysis of the above-mentioned principle is considered in relation to the network of intra-EU double tax conventions, which are inspired by reciprocity due to their bilateral nature and other legal levels which operate in such context, namely the EU and the WTO. In fact, the exclusion of the direct taxation from the competences of the EU and, consequently, exclusive competence that the EU Member States have to negotiate and sign double tax conventions, cannot give to them the opportunity to provide every kind of rules. In particular, according to the CJEU case law, EU Member States must comply, on one side, with EU law and especially with the four market freedoms that cannot be restricted by international bilateral agreements based on reciprocity and, on the other side, with international obligations derived from the WTO (whose parties are EU Member States and the EU too). By contextualizing intra-EU double tax conventions in a EU internal market law-logic, this thesis has demonstrated that the existence of a most-favoured-nation clause enforceable to the provisions of such double tax conventions is the obvious consequence of a systematic EU interpretation.