Three Essays on Structural Power in Corporate Governance: A Critique and Reappraisal

Governance theorists have been notoriously concerned with the generation and allocation of power among a firm’s constituents and, with few exceptions, have conceived of it as structural. Throughout this extensive body of research, one major limitation lies in its incomplete and provisional attempt to reconcile the structural and functional dimensions of power and to show how they are systematically interrelated. It is therefore altogether fitting for the present work to seek this integration. Based on three studies––of which two empirical and one conceptual––this dissertation cuts a swath through fields where structuralist assumptions remain especially prevalent and offers a more organic understanding of who (truly) governs the business firm. Essay 1 and Essay 2 contribute to the extensive literature on CEO succession, where power dynamics are most fraught. For the first time, research on this salient topic benefits from empirical validation (or confutation) of the classic theories used to explain CEO dismissal—deconstructing, at first, and then refining its underlying political dynamics. In a downward arc from the upper to the lower echelons, the third essay explores the foundational concept of ownership power, advancing a configurational understanding of the construct. To enhance understanding of the substantive issues raised later in this work, each essay makes use of different epistemological approaches, causal logics and analytical methodologies aimed at developing theory.