Three Essays on Behavioral Game Theory

Many economic interactions are shaped by decisions that de- pend on others’ behavior. This dissertation uses experimental economics and evolutionary game theory to study human be- havior across several economic settings, showing how actions may arise from different underlying forces. First, it develops a model of the evolution of conventions under uncertainty, in coordination games where payoffs vary across scenarios fol- lowing an ergodic Markov process. Using stochastic stability analysis, it shows that rare scenarios may determine long-run equilibrium selection, and that agents’ mistakes shape which scenarios become pivotal. Hence, focusing on the most com- mon or average scenario may yield wrong predictions. Then, this dissertation turns to communication, using an experiment to examine behavior in sender–receiver games where truth- ful messages may be used deceptively. Combining actions, elicited beliefs, and messages in a non-strategic counterpart, it develops a method that identifies more deceptive intentions than previous approaches, distinguishing actual deceivers from pessimistic truth-tellers and detecting senders who con- ceal their deceptive intentions. Finally, this dissertation studies how third parties punish communication, using an experi- ment that isolates the roles of a report’s veracity and its eco- nomic consequences. Results show that sanctions are driven mainly by consequences. Lying plays a secondary and context- dependent role, whereas truth-telling mitigates punishment but does not offset distributional concerns. Besides, sanctions are strongly related to personal and injunctive norms, but not to empirical expectations. Taken together, this disserta- tion shows that identifying the mechanisms behind observed choices is essential for understanding economic behavior.