Destruction of artworks within copyright law: a moral rights perspective

The present dissertation examines whether the author’s moral right of integrity encompasses the right to object to the destruction of artworks. It starts from the normative standpoint that the destruction of certain artworks may affect not only the author, but also a wider community that engages with the work and attributes cultural meaning to it. The research develops along three main lines of inquiry. First, the dissertation reassesses the theoretical foundations of moral rights and their capacity to address contemporary challenges. By tracing the historical and philosophical evolution of moral rights, it shows that their development has been neither linear nor conceptually stable. This inquiry exposes structural ambiguities and practical limitations within the current moral rights framework, particularly in the European context, where harmonization remains limited and normative assumptions diverge. Against this background, the dissertation advances a pluralistic and relational account of moral rights, arguing that the bond between author and work is not purely personal but embedded in a broader cultural and social context, where the beneficiaries of the work are a co-interested party in the preservation of such bond. Visual art, and especially its destruction, provides a privileged testing ground for this reconceptualization, due to its materiality, uniqueness, and often public dimension. Second, the dissertation analyses why destruction has remained a controversial and unresolved issue within moral rights doctrine for such a long time. Focusing on Article 6-bis of the Berne Convention, it explains the doctrinal and interpretative obstacles that have prevented a clear response to destruction claims, particularly where in cases of conflict between integrity and third-party property rights. Through a comparative law analysis, the research identifies recurring interpretative approaches and balancing criteria used by courts and legislators when destruction is at stake. It evaluates whether, and to what extent, cultural or community-related interests are implicitly or explicitly taken into account, and whether moral rights have ever been understood as carrying a broader cultural dimension. Third, the dissertation explores the potential role of the moral right of integrity in addressing a normative gap between copyright law and cultural heritage law. It shows that many artworks may be lawfully destroyed in a temporal zone where copyright protection remains in force, but heritage protection has not yet been formalized. In this context, the dissertation proposes a pluralistic model of integrity that conceives the right as a community-oriented interim tool for protection of certain works, conceptually enlarging the subjects entitled to enforce it. By using destruction as a doctrinal and conceptual stress test, this dissertation develops an original pluralistic theory of moral rights and offers a renewed normative foundation for the moral right of integrity. It argues that moral rights, if newly understood, can contribute to sustaining culture as a shared space, while respecting the coexistence of authorship, ownership, and collective cultural interests.