How do firms integrate sustainability criteria into executive remuneration contracts?

This dissertation aims to advance our understanding on how firms integrate sustainability related criteria into executive remuneration, and to help identify the determinants of a more substantive, rather than merely symbolic, adoption of this form of remuneration among listed companies. It investigates this emerging corporate governance phenomenon through two archival-based empirical studies in two distinct contexts, the Italian and the broader European settings. The first study focuses on the Italian context, examining the extent to which firms whose boards comprise directors appointed by minority shareholders integrate CSR contracting. Drawing upon stakeholder-agency theory, it sheds light on the role of directors appointed by minority shareholders in constraining or fostering the substantive integration of CSR contracting, and whether the role of the board of directors differs depending on the identity of the controlling blockholder. The second study extends the focus of analysis to the European setting. Drawing upon institutional and stakeholder-agency theory, it helps advance the existing comparative approach to CSR by examining how social and environmental regulatory pressure and its interaction with firm-level mechanisms, namely ownership concentration and industry sensitivity to sustainability-related issues, might explain the intense use of CSR contracting among large listed firms in Europe.