Agency conflicts, family ownership, and CEO pay for performance sensitivity. Executive turnover and familial relations: family controlled firms and family CEOs in Italy. Family ownership, earnings management, and CEO turnover.
Corporate governance issues in family and non-family owned firms: an empirical analysis of CEO compensation, executive turnover, and earnings management
MACCIOCCHI, DANIELE
2014
Abstract
Agency conflicts, family ownership, and CEO pay for performance sensitivity. Executive turnover and familial relations: family controlled firms and family CEOs in Italy. Family ownership, earnings management, and CEO turnover.File in questo prodotto:
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento:
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14242/62296
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URN:NBN:IT:LUISS-62296