Il sistema di Robilant. Il riposizionamento internazionale dell'Italia dalla politica del «pendolo» a quella della «botte di ferro»

Paying due attention to the diplomatic documentation of the Kingdom of Italy, the two Allied Empires of 1882 and the other major European powers, the aim was to outline the history of Italian foreign policy in the interval between the fall of the Second French Empire and the first renewal of the Triple Alliance in 1887. In particular, the exploits of those who led the Consulta and the ambassadors, mainly those in Berlin and Vienna, such as Marquis Visconti Venosta, Count Luigi Corti and Count Felice Nicolis di Robilant, were also reviewed. With regard to the latter, ambassador to the Austro-Hungarian Empire from 1871 and then Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1885-87, we have carefully reviewed the diplomatic work that enabled the young Kingdom, particularly between the period of isolation (1878-81) and that of the first renewal of the Triple Alliance (1887), to emerge from the delicate situation into which it had plunged in the aftermath of the Congress of Berlin and to find its strategic interests safeguarded, such as the status quo in the Mediterranean and the Balkan region. The results outline how Italy's foreign policy has struggled to carve out its own international position over the course of almost two decades. The choice of 1870 is crucial because, in addition to representing, quoting Bonghi, a 'momentous' date in the history of international relations, it also represented for the young Kingdom of Italy the first time that the Italian government followed a different path from what was believed to be its 'guardian': Napoleon III. In fact, the choice of neutrality and the stalling of the Franco-Italian-Austrian negotiations for a hypothetical alliance against the Kingdom of Prussia marked, already two months before Sedan, the end of that alliance that until then had made Italy to be perceived as a 'vassal' or 'southern offshoot' of the Second Empire. The policy following the Peace of Frankfurt in 1871 saw Italy, whose foreign policy was firmly in the hands of Marquis Visconti Venosta, juggle skilfully between what were then considered the two poles of the European Continent, Berlin, and Paris, and try to maintain good relations with the neighbouring Austro-Hungarian Empire and the two 'side' powers, the Russian Empire, and the United Kingdom. In particular, the choice of equidistance between Paris and Berlin - the so-called 'policy of the pendulum', following Visconti Venosta's maxim of 'always independent, never isolated' - was not easy to maintain for a medium-sized power like Italy and the only way to continue in this sense was to strengthen internal institutions as well as the economy on the one hand and to increase the country's credibility in the eyes of the great European powers on the other. This meant the abandonment, at least momentarily, of any territorial ambitions and to take off, as Bismarck did in 1871, the 'revolutionary' jacket in the international system. The advent of the Left to power, with irredentist elements within it, and the worsening of the Crisis of the East in 1876 through the system created by Visconti Venosta plunged into crisis. This was quite evident at the Congress in Berlin in June-July 1878 where Italy, represented by Foreign Minister Count Luigi Corti, by now conducting a 'renunciatory' foreign policy and at the same time allowing the cells of the irredentist party to roam freely, was now seen as a 'disturbing' element of the European status quo. And although Count Corti's policy of refusals, the so-called 'clean hands', tried to 'appease' the other powers of the European Concert, the unsteady behaviour of some elements of the Italian government of the time regarding the irredentist phenomenon and the ever-increasing demand for 'compensation' in the Italian-speaking lands of the Austro-Hungarian Empire plunged the Kingdom into diplomatic isolation. It was therefore not surprising if at the end of the Congress of Berlin Italy was left with 'empty hands', isolated diplomatically and in a full crisis with Austria-Hungary, while the Austro-German Duality was taking shape. Thus, Visconti Venosta's nightmare had come true, which became even greater when the Treaty of Bardo in May 1881 delivered the Regency of Tunis into the hands of the French. The ‘Schiaffo di Tunisi’ was the launching pad for the decisive change of direction between Italy and the Austrian German 'iron ring', which was formed as one in the Zweibund of October 1879. Italian foreign policy, led by the new Foreign Minister Mancini and the Secretary General for Foreign Affairs, Alberto Blanc, decided to turn towards the two Central European capitals. This 'stroke of the rudder' was, however, de facto the concretisation of something already presents in the real country that, in one fell swoop, reopened the old question of the choice of alliance between Paris and Berlin already in vogue in the aftermath of Bonaparte's fall. Italy was thus making its second swing since Unification and, just as the Kingdom of Sardinia with Plombières had opted for Paris to satisfy its foreign policy interests, Italy was now swinging towards Berlin and then Vienna. As the 'greatest of the small powers' or 'smallest of the great', Italy, flanking the two Central European empires, was making a necessary field choice to pursue its national interests in foreign policy, which, as had been well seen with the Crisis of 1876-78 and then with Tunis, needed the support of a great power such as Paris or, given the power it had acquired after 1870, Berlin. In fact, from the second half of May 1881 onwards, there was a growing cross-party movement throughout the country inciting a rapprochement with the German Empire and Austria-Hungary. The spokesmen for this initiative were the deputies of the Centre, led by Sidney Sonnino, who made their opinion heard from the columns of their main press organ, the 'Rassegna Settimanale'. Part of the Right, represented by Minghetti and Sella, and the Crispin Left also joined the position taken by the parliamentary centre. Throughout the spring-summer of 1881, a parliamentary and media debate opened against those who still referred to the policy of independence and which saw Depretis, in the meantime returned to Palazzo Braschi, together with the Right of Bonghi, Peruzzi, Lanza and Visconti Venosta, who courageously condemned the Italian government more than the French for the Tunis affair and remained, as did the Extreme, faithful to the Cavourrian tradition of friendship with Paris. A division that this time, due to the hostility of the French republicans towards Italian aspirations – given the resonance Tunis had on Italian public opinion and the non-Francophiles – saw the former finally prevail over the latter. The pain of Tunis overrode the 'deafening sorrow' for the Italian-speaking territories of the Dual Monarchy and, given that 'to get to Berlin one had to first pass-through Vienna', made the alliance with Austria-Hungary acceptable even to old militants like Crispi. The latter now declared himself willing to accept the necessity of the integrity of the Habsburg Monarchy for the maintenance of European equilibrium and convinced that the path to national greatness lay through an alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary. The supporters of neutrality and friendship with Paris were thus defeated in a climate that had now changed and saw the ranks of the partisans for an alliance with the Central Empires growing day by day. Sincerely opposed at the time of the first contacts between Rome and Vienna for the sealing of an alliance and at the same time disturbed by the strange attitude that part of the government had towards irredentist demonstrations, the Count of Robilant, as negotiator in Vienna, worked tirelessly to ensure that his country emerged with dignity from the negotiations with the two Empires. Thanks to his skill, at the crisis of the Alliance of the Three Emperors, Italy managed to gain a place in the defensive and conservative alliance with the two Central Empires. The very important agreement, reached on 20 May 1882 between the German Empire, the Kingdom of Italy and Austria-Hungary at the Ballhausplatz, was a minor success of Italian diplomacy at the time. Italy, in the midst of political-diplomatic stagnation and crushed by Bismarck's machinations between the Hapsburg hammer and the anvil of Tunis, as well as "propping up the monarchical institution" had managed to secure, ope legis, that guarantee over Rome which, if it could not be recognised de jure by the two Empires, so as not to compromise their relations with the Holy See, was recognised in fact by the three Monarchies who promised to "ensure the maintenance of social and political order in their respective States" in order to safeguard "peace and friendship". Any possible friction over the age-old Roman question was thus removed. A further advantage, advocated by Mancini and negotiated directly by the Count of Robilant, was the maximum circumscription of Italy's commitments in the alliance. Another success of the Piedmontese count's negotiation was to avoid subjecting the alliance to a "policy of principles", ruling out any attempt at meddling by the authoritarian ways of the two Empires in internal affairs and to the detriment of the liberal institutions granted by the Fundamental Statute of the Kingdom - of which the count, in spite of the accusations that wanted him to be "reactionary" and "prussophile", had repeatedly stood up as a defender. Notwithstanding the successes, there were several shortcomings on issues of national interest: the Mediterranean and the Balkans, which were not considered by the allied governments due to the diplomatic weakness with which the Italian government had presented itself at the negotiations - in addition to the explicit renunciation made by Minister Mancini, in contravention of Robilant's warnings to stall and not immediately throw itself into the arms of Vienna and Berlin. This weakness was, however, the result of the ambivalent and 'adventuristic' policy conducted by the Left in those years, which, except for the interlude of the second Depretis government that had almost reached an agreement with London and Vienna at the beginning of 1878, had been renouncing any Mediterranean or Balkan 'compensation' proposed to them by the great powers, concentrating its sights only on the Austrian districts of Trento and Rovereto. The lack of vision on the part of the ministries of the Left, by putting some of the Italian-speaking lands belonging to the Habsburg Crown at the top of any 'compensation' proposal, had barred the way to any policy in defence of their interests in the Mediterranean-Balkan quadrant. For this reason, Count di Robilant pointed out the limits of the Italian government's recklessness in signing without waiting for the propitious moment that, according to the royal ambassador in Vienna, would only be achieved by stalling. In fact, the maximum stability in Europe, achieved in 1884 with the resumption of the Alliance of the Three Emperors and the policy of good relations between Germany and France, corresponded to a lower international capacity of Italy which, in the two-year period 1884-85, reached one of its lowest points in foreign policy. The frequent complaints from those who had supported the signing of the Triple Alliance were not without foundation when they condemned the relations between Rome and the Central Empires. Robilant, in a conversation with Count Kálnoky on 1 April 1884, pointed out the terrible state in which the Triple League had fallen after two years. The Italian diplomat showed the Imperial-Royal Foreign Minister that he was disappointed by the 'complete abstention' behaviour the two allies were displaying in all matters that harmed Italian interests from Egypt to the Balkans. In spite of the fact that relations within the alliance had deteriorated since 1882 and this, as mentioned, must be read in conjunction with the changing relations of the two Empires with Russia and France, the Italian ambassador's opinion towards the Triple Alliance did not change, for despite the difficulties and disappointments towards Italy he remained convinced that 'in whatever way [... ] consider our present situation I find that, if it is not what I would wish it to be, [...] it is better than it was before those alliance agreements were reached'. The last part of the research focuses on the crucial role that Count di Robilant played as the Kingdom's new Minister of Foreign Affairs in the renewal of the Triple Alliance and the introduction of the two bilateral treaties with Austria-Hungary and Germany in February 1887 plus the Mediterranean agreements with the Kingdom of Spain and the United Kingdom. The appointment of the Italian ambassador to Vienna as Foreign Minister was not an easy matter, so much so that it required the direct involvement of King Umberto I. The sovereign, as well as a good part of the Italian elite, believed only Robilant would be a 'minister capable of inspiring in the [allied] cabinets the widest confidence'. During the years he held that office (1885-1887), di Robilant aimed at improving the Triple Alliance through a policy of stalling for time to achieve better guarantees for Italian interests. The nomination of the brilliant diplomat to the Consulta was welcomed in Berlin and Vienna, where the count was renowned for his monarchical faith and diplomatic skills demonstrated in fifteen years of experience in the Habsburg capital. Prince Bismarck, although Ambassador de Launay, in a conversation with him in Friedrichsruh, had confessed to him that the new minister's greatest favourite was to faire sans dire, enthusiastically approved Robilant's appointment, adding that he did not mind dealing with 'a soldier and a gentleman' such as the new Italian minister. Emblematic was the description made by the Imperial Chancellor, who, also because of the resurgence of the Eastern Crisis, considerably revalorised, as in 1882, Italy's importance on the European chessboard, describing the new minister as a 'statesman, with no other agenda than to serve the interests of the Crown and the country'. Such words of praise, however, were not fully reciprocated by di Robilant, who considered Bismarck to be a 'scourge' and his system of alliances, as well as his modus operandi, a harbinger of possible future instability on the Continent. Contrary to what many would have expected in Vienna and Berlin, Robilant maintained with firmness, dignity and considerable skill a reserved attitude in the face of what he used to call the 'pro tempore master of the world', also avoiding personal visits, or, as he often repeated, calls ad audiendum verbum, confident that only in this way would he make Bismarck like him and his policies – as in fact happened due to the change in the international situation during 1885. The work of the new regent of the Consulta was also favoured by the events of 1885, which had shattered the policy of 'isolation in the Triple Alliance’ with a consequent revaluation of Rome by the chancelleries of Berlin and Vienna. Count di Robilant's diplomacy benefited from the new international order right from the start and, moving with confidence, made it clear to the two Central Empires that Italy was not satisfied with the alliance and that it would have wished for a renewal of the Treaty on a different basis that would have accommodated the Mediterranean and Balkan interests of the Kingdom. Due to the new international circumstances, among which were the revived Austro-Russian rivalry in the Balkans and the resurgence of Franco-German rivalry in Europe, the Prince of Bismarck expressed his readiness to amend the treaty. Benefiting from this new situation, the Count of Robilant immediately moved confidently in the direction of Paris and the Central Empires. In fact, the Foreign Minister immediately aimed to make the Italian presence felt in the Balkans. In one of the first ministerial circulars, he indicated that, in the question of the annexation of Rumelia to the Principality of Bulgaria, Italy would proceed in agreement with Bismarck to eliminate any form of conflict between Vienna and St Petersburg; shortly afterwards he liquidated any hope of intervention in favour of Serbia and Greece, since Italy's objective 'could have no other inspiration, except the desire to ensure the maintenance of peace'. True to his maxim faire sans dire, the Count of Robilant had shaped the Kingdom's new course of action in foreign policy and, thanks in part to the difficulties of Berlin and Vienna with Paris and St. Petersburg, obtained the renewal of the treaty in February 1887 with profitable advantages for Italian interests. These were to be found, thanks to di Robilant's skill, in the stipulation of two separate bilateral annexes to the Treaty of 1882, which extended the Triple Alliance from purely 'continental' to Mediterranean and Balkan: one stipulated with Austria-Hungary aimed at extending the validity of the principles of stability and preservation of the Triple Axis to the Balkan context and the islands of the Ottoman Aegean, introducing the famous and controversial article concerning 'territorial compensation' in the event of an alteration of the Balkan balance in favour of one of the two powers; the other with the German Empire, aimed at maintaining the status quo in North Africa and the western Mediterranean. In short, with the Annexes of 1887, Italy protected itself from a new ‘Tunisi’. The renewal and stipulation of the two Addendum Pacts to the Triple Alliance Treaty was a victory for Italian diplomacy led by Count Robilant: under the protection of the 'preservation of peace and the European status quo', Italian interests in the Mediterranean and the Balkans were also brought under the umbrella of the 'preservation of peace and the European status quo' against any initiative that would alter the balance without the direct participation of Rome. Once again Robilant had succeeded in achieving a radical change to the alliance, perfecting those 'gaps' that had arisen after 1882, but which, given the condition from which Italian foreign policy had emerged in the first five years of the Left government, was impossible to demand from the first Triplice. This success, which was followed shortly afterwards by the Mediterranean Entente with London and Madrid, was mainly due to the skill of the Italian minister, who had been able to achieve a considerable increase in commitment on the part of the two allies without corresponding obligations on the part of Rome. What came to be known as the 'Robilant system' finally guaranteed Italy the longed-for land and maritime security, finally putting it on an equal footing with the Allies. The pendular policy that had characterised post-Sedan Italy now turned towards that of a harmonious system, in that famous 'barrel of iron' in which di Robilant left Italy at the end of the winter of 1887.