The insolvency proceedings against a company with unlimited liability, and the bankruptcy proceedings which involve the shareholders of the said company are independent from one another even though we can consider the two closely related. This legal distinction takes place because current insolvency laws consider the patrimonial autonomy of the two insolvency/bankruptcy asset procedures in accordance with the law under Article 148 l. fall. Conversely, given the closely identifiable bodies of the legal proceedings, the two procedures are also considered connected. Even when the general partners can demonstrate that they did not manage the company at all, regardless of any request or demands from the creditors or the company, the bankruptcy of the general partners happens automatically; indeed legal procedures involving the general partners happens as a sort of repercussion since the general partners cannot limit their own liability towards third parties. Differently for the limited partner members, the extensive effect of the insolvency procedure, does not produce the same effect against this group; however, in accordance with art. 2320 cc, the limited partner member who has interfered in the management of the company will lose the benefit of limited liability protection--even if he or she did not take on the role of general partner or, exercise the use of a power of attorney on behalf of the company or its members. Thus the general partners are declared bankrupt simply because of their company membership; essentially, the default of this group is a social default. In this manner, it is believed that the law 1471 is an exception to the general rule which states that only individual entrepreneurs can declare bankruptcy. Indeed it is a partial abrogation from the provision of art 5.1. fall., regardless of the default status of the member. In conclusion, the aforementioned insolvency rule was introduced with the aim of protecting the commercial creditors. It is clear that the objective was to create, for the shareholders, legal guarantees which favor social creditors and which do not harm the interests of special creditors. This rule was put in place for reasons of convenience, not to mention its punitive intent. The rationale of such a provision, therefore, must be sought in strengthening the general guarantee of obligations contracted by the company through the patrimony of individual members and this can only concretely occur within a bankruptcy procedure which is able to ensure the equal treatment of creditors par condicio creditorum
Anche se strettamente collegati, il fallimento della società e dei soci illimitatamente responsabili sono procedimenti indipendenti fra loro; indipendenti in considerazione dell'autonomia patrimoniale delle due procedure fallimentari, prevista dall'art. 148 l. fall.; connessi, stante l'identità degli organi delle due procedure. Il fallimento dei soci accomandatari si verifica automaticamente, per ripercussione, non potendo questi ultimi limitare in alcun modo la propria responsabilità nei confronti dei terzi, benché dimostrino, di fatto, di non aver amministrato la società e a prescindere da qualsiasi richiesta dei creditori o della società. L'effetto estensivo del fallimento, diversamente, non si produce nei confronti dei soci accomandanti; tuttavia, a mente dell'art. 2320 c.c. l'accomandante che si sia ingerito nella gestione della società decade dal beneficio della responsabilità limitata, pur non assumendo né la qualifica di accomandatario né, correlativamente, il potere di rappresentanza. I soci accomandatari, dunque, falliscono per il solo fatto di essere soci; si tratta, in sostanza, di un fallimento che dipende dal fallimento sociale, in guisa tale da doversi ritenere che l'art. 147 l. fall. sia norma eccezionale rispetto alla regola generale di fallibilità dei soli imprenditori individuali, nonché derogatoria rispetto alla previsione di cui all'art. 5 l. fall., prescindendo dallo stato di insolvenza del socio. In definitiva, si tratta di una norma introdotta per ragioni di opportunità, oltre che con intento sanzionatorio, finalizzata alla tutela dei creditori commerciali con l'evidente obiettivo di realizzare, in capo ai soci, la garanzia legale posta a favore dei creditori sociali, senza tuttavia ledere gli interessi dei creditori particolari. La ratio di siffatta disposizione, pertanto, deve essere ricercata nel rafforzamento della garanzia generale delle obbligazioni contratte dalla società attraverso il patrimonio individuale dei soci e ciò può concretamente verificarsi soltanto all'interno di una procedura fallimentare, capace di garantire la par condicio creditorum.
Il fallimento delle società in accomandita semplice
DIDONE, ANDREA
2015
Abstract
The insolvency proceedings against a company with unlimited liability, and the bankruptcy proceedings which involve the shareholders of the said company are independent from one another even though we can consider the two closely related. This legal distinction takes place because current insolvency laws consider the patrimonial autonomy of the two insolvency/bankruptcy asset procedures in accordance with the law under Article 148 l. fall. Conversely, given the closely identifiable bodies of the legal proceedings, the two procedures are also considered connected. Even when the general partners can demonstrate that they did not manage the company at all, regardless of any request or demands from the creditors or the company, the bankruptcy of the general partners happens automatically; indeed legal procedures involving the general partners happens as a sort of repercussion since the general partners cannot limit their own liability towards third parties. Differently for the limited partner members, the extensive effect of the insolvency procedure, does not produce the same effect against this group; however, in accordance with art. 2320 cc, the limited partner member who has interfered in the management of the company will lose the benefit of limited liability protection--even if he or she did not take on the role of general partner or, exercise the use of a power of attorney on behalf of the company or its members. Thus the general partners are declared bankrupt simply because of their company membership; essentially, the default of this group is a social default. In this manner, it is believed that the law 1471 is an exception to the general rule which states that only individual entrepreneurs can declare bankruptcy. Indeed it is a partial abrogation from the provision of art 5.1. fall., regardless of the default status of the member. In conclusion, the aforementioned insolvency rule was introduced with the aim of protecting the commercial creditors. It is clear that the objective was to create, for the shareholders, legal guarantees which favor social creditors and which do not harm the interests of special creditors. This rule was put in place for reasons of convenience, not to mention its punitive intent. The rationale of such a provision, therefore, must be sought in strengthening the general guarantee of obligations contracted by the company through the patrimony of individual members and this can only concretely occur within a bankruptcy procedure which is able to ensure the equal treatment of creditors par condicio creditorumFile | Dimensione | Formato | |
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https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14242/96511
URN:NBN:IT:UNIVPM-96511