Justice and Forced Migration: Beyond the Open Borders Debate

This work is composed of two main parts. Part I is composed of four chapters. Chapter 1 offers a critical overview of the interdisciplinary debate on what counts as forced migration and who is a refugee. It argues that scholars tend to attribute much of the normative salience of concepts such as those of forced migration and refugees to their implications for admission policies in closed borders scenarios. Chapter 2 considers what makes forced migration harmful and distinctively different from voluntary migration. Referring to empirical qualitative works and narratives of forced migrants’ displacement experiences, it illustrates four kinds of harms related to forced displacement: namely, losses of control, the loss of what I call the “Home environment”, losses in social status and material wealth, and a loss of mental wellbeing. Such harms apply also to forced migrants who do not experience restrictions to freedom of movement (e.g., in the case of internal displacement or when borders have been opened). Thus, forced migration remains normatively relevant even when admission is not an issue. Chapter 3 argues that what forced migrants need once displaced depends on the specific harms of displacement. The harms of displacement distinctively undermine the fundamental interests that all human beings share in having place and purpose, which provide the conditions for a dignified, minimally flourishing life. Thus, forced migrants have distinctive claim rights, analogous to human rights, to the fulfilment of the needs that derive from the harms of displacement. Chapter 4 moves to the issue of who is responsible for addressing the specific needs of forced migrants and how. I argue that not only states of origin but also external states and non-state actors often individually or jointly contribute to forced displacement. Agents whose actions caused displacement or contributed to processes and structures causing displacement bear reparative responsibility towards those who have been harmed by displacement. Therefore, meeting the needs of forced migrants is not just a matter of humanitarian obligations, but rather an issue of justice. Finally, I propose three principles that policies should respect to count as reparations for the harms of displacement: namely, the specificity, continuity, and expressivity principles. Based on this theoretical frame, part II explores three case studies. Chapter 5 is devoted to forced displacement in Colombia, which counts the largest number of internally displaced people worldwide. The chapter explores displacement underlying causes, shows how the specific harms suffered by Colombian forced migrants shape their needs and illustrates how current policy approaches fail to adequately recognise and repair those harms. Chapter 6 looks at a form of forced migration taking place across borders in a regional free-movement area, namely intra–European Union trafficking for labour exploitation. Finally, chapter 7 is devoted to forced migration from Syria. The chapter adopts a harms-based approach to responsibility and to needs assessment and it illustrates shortcomings even in the policy of a European state, namely Germany, which has been praised for its generosity and efficiency in providing admission and integration to Syrian forced migrants.