THE PROBLEM OF DETERMINATION IN KANT, HEGEL AND FERRARIS’ NEW REALISM

The dissertation deals with the problem of realism in continental philosophy. Three authors representing three paradigms of continental philosophy are analyzed: Kant (correlationism), Hegel (absolute idealism), and Ferraris (new realism). The analysis of the works of these authors confirms the hypothesis raised in the dissertation that the question of realism is a question of the source of determination. Using the arguments presented by the three authors, the position that the source of determination is individual atomic objects is rejected. The dissertation reveals the Kantian concept of the source of determination as transcendental subjectivity - structure prior to concrete human subjects, but at the same time essentially tied to them. Contrary to what is usually claimed in the works of the new realists, it is shown that Hegel’s philosophy is not correlationist. The similarities and differences between the critiques of absolute idealists and the critiques of the new realists are shown, thus revealing that idealists were concerned with very similar problems in Kantian philosophy as contemporary realists. In the dissertation, I aim to show that the Hegelian concept of the absolute as a source of determination is a valid alternative to both post-Kantian correlationism and new realism. Finally, Ferraris’ analysis of philosophy shows that the latter fails to develop an original positive conception of reality.