Empathy and Deliberation. From the Standard Definition to an Integrated Phenomenological Approach

The goal of this dissertation is to explore how empathy affects the deliberative process. To do so, I will first define how empathy and deliberation are conventionally understood in the contemporary literature and identify how empathy is thought to affect the deliberative process accordingly. Second, I will argue that this way of framing empathy and its role in deliberation can be particularly problematic from both an epistemic and a moral perspective. Third, I will propose an alternative approach to defining empathy and its role in deliberation. Specifically, I will argue that phenomenological empathy, as opposed to the standard way in which empathy is characterized in the contemporary debate, is a better way to understand the specific nature of the phenomenon and a better ally in our deliberations. In Chapter 1, I will propose a definition of empathy, which I will call the Standard Definition (SD), according to which empathy consists of three phenomena: cognitive empathy understood as perspective taking, affective empathy understood as emotional sharing, and sympathy understood as concern for the welfare of others. In Chapter 2, I will propose a standard definition (SD) of deliberation, according to which the deliberative process is characterized as a mental activity aimed at deciding, by weighing different kinds of reasons, what to think (theoretical deliberation) and what to do (practical deliberation). In particular, I will focus on deliberative processes that I will call "other-directed," that is, those deliberative processes that have as their object or involve one or more people. In Chapter 3, I will identify and discuss how empathy, as defined in SD, appears to contribute to other-directed deliberation: First, cognitive empathy is thought to play an epistemic role. Second, affective empathy seems capable of grounding our moral judgments. Third, both cognitive and affective empathy are thought to play a motivational role. In Chapter 4, I will challenge the idea that cognitive empathy is the best option for fulfilling the epistemic role assigned to it, since it can be inaccurate due to its many cognitive biases and can pose a threat to the agency of the person to whom it is directed. In chapter 5, I will challenge the assumption that empathy, especially affective empathy, is the best source, both conceptually and normatively, for moral motivation and moral judgment because of its selective and partial nature. In Chapter 6, I will attempt to show that when the broader context of empathy is ignored, as it is in SD, it can harm rather than strengthen our interpersonal relationships by fostering instances of epistemic injustice. In Chapter 7, I will outline the salient aspects of Edith Stein's account of empathy in her book On the Problem of Empathy (1917) and, inspired by her account, tentatively define what phenomenological empathy is. In Chapter 8, I will highlight the differences between phenomenological empathy and the SD of empathy, and how these differences allow the former to mitigate or avoid the problems the latter encounters when involved in other-directed deliberation. This will allow me to argue in chapter 9 that phenomenological empathy plays an eminently epistemic role, the depth and scope of which is different and limited from the role attributed to the SD of empathy. Not only does it provide direct, albeit partial, access to the other's inner states, but it can also recognize the other as a person, that is, as a bearer of motives and hierarchically organized values.