Il problema dell'intenzionalità nella filosofia di Merleau-Ponty

This work intends to explore the concept of operative intentionality in Merleau Ponty starting with his first works up to Le visible et l’invisible, highlighting the different subjects which intentionality is related to: body, language, existence, inter- subjectivity, temporality, ontology and many others. The reference area is phenomenological, because each time Marleau Ponty starts again from Husserl to develop his reasoning. The approach that we have favoured is gnoseological putting in this word the area of pre-reflexive knowledge where is shown the operative intentionality that precedes the true intellectual knowledge .Starting from these introductions, we think that the more authentic dimension of intentionality is to be found in “the so called first Merlau Ponty” where the subject is dealt with in a deeper way. Moreover we have kept a link with the meaning that Husserl gives to intentionality and, above all, with the concept of conscience that, even if bodily, is always directed towards something. ”Something “, obviously, is not only the noema, but also the background of our intentional activity. In regard to these subjects, we have tried to express a definition starting from the introduction to the Phénoménologie de la perception. Here in fact, the distinction between act intentionality act and operative intentionality is highlighted by Husserl. The first one refers to ”our judgements and to our voluntary attitude” and refers to the definition of Ideas 1 by Husserl. The second one is based on a pre-reflexive level and acts passively and anonymously. Merlau-Ponty intervenes on the operative intentionality, making it the central interest of his reflection. In regard to Husserl’s position we have tried to highlight the main theoretical novelty introduced by Mertleau Ponty and that is to make the body, not the conscience, the main reference of intentionality and the point from which spread, to use Husserl’s words, the “intentional rays”. Moreover, the operative intentionality is tied to Lebenswelt, this can be considered the second main innovation of the French philosopher. In this context we have tried to show the body activity acts at motor and space level throughthe bodily scheme and sexuality. The concept of intentional arc suggested by Merleau-Ponty in the Phénoménologie de la perception, unfortunately, isn’t explicated properly by the French Philosopher. We have attempted to tie it to unitary conception of intentionality based on generality and simultaneousness. After that we have tried to condense in concept of sedimentation the reference to time , language and intersubjectivity. In this area, in fact, bodily intentionality can be expressed completely in its acting dimension. We have also proposed a comparison on the subject of time with the ideas of Husserl, developing the definition of temporality as a network of operative intentionality.This subject, then, has been tied to sedimentation and dialectic between new and acquired in the area of language communication . In his last works Merleau-Ponty thinks over the concept of intentionality and characterizes it in an ontological Meaning more and more, and lets new concepts such as “flesh”, “chiasm”, “being wild” and so on, come into play. Our interpretation of operative intentionality, as inner intentionality of being is mainly based on three basic concepts of the last Merleau-Ponty “dimensionality,” overstepping and above all simultaneity.