La distinzione tra internal ed external questions. Una rivalutazione della proposta carnapiana

The central theme of the thesis is the analysis of the distinction between internal and external questions, pointed out by Carnap since 1950. In particular, the main objective on which the structure of the project is based, is to consider the possibility of re-interpreting the carnapian distinction and its consequences - despite Quine criticism - at different levels: linguistic, but mainly epistemological and ontological. The leading idea of this work is actually to consider the possibility that through the analysis of this distinction - referring in this regard also to the writings before and after 1950 - could emerge, on the one hand, the ineffectiveness of partial quinenan criticism and secondly, the influence that this distinction has had and still has on the post-positivist epistemology, as well as on the contemporary ontological debate, in some sense also metaphysical. The aim of the study is, in full harmony with what has been mentioned as a sort of carnapian renaissance, to show how, in a misleading way - apparently just after the final Quine's criticism - Carnap's proposal had been abandoned too quickly, considering it as a true and lawful expression of a foundational epistemology. The conclusion towards which this research is directed, takes an opposite way thus aiming at highlighting which could be, thanks to the guide line represented by the external/internal distinction, the carnapian's instances that are also found in the contemporary ontological and epistemological debates. The goal of Chapter I is to identify and analyze the origins of the distinction made by Carnap, both in Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology (1950) and in Replies and Systematic Expositions (1963), between internal/external questions and trying to show how this could not simply seem a trick used by Carnap, in the so-called semantic phase of his thought, to determine what the status of abstract entities could be as far as semantics is concerned. Chapter II is focused on the presentation of Quine's criticism particularly on the position pointed out by Quine in On Carnap's View on Ontology (1951) and Carnap and Logical Truth (1960). In Chapter III the recent proposal are described, particularly those supported by Huw Price, who address the possibility of considering the views of Carnap and Quine not opposite anymore but instead related even though following different point of view on certain issue. In Chapter IV - taking into account the conclusions reached in previous chapters, particularly in the third, about the possible influence of the distinction between internal and external questions on the post-positivist and post-foundational epistemology - the objective is to set up a comparison between the carnapian proposal and the kuhnian theory of scientific revolutions, analyzing the carnapian concept of scientific theory. Finally, Chapter V, considering that the distinction between internal and external questions, and in particular the article in which it is made explicit, are thought to be the main references to reconstruct the position taken by Carnap against ontological issues, is dedicated to an ontological depth of this perspective and of what, was described as "neutral attitude" by Carnap himself.