ONTOLOGIA TEMPORALE E SENSO COMUNE

Temporal ontology is the philosophical inquiry into the ontic status of non-present temporal entities, i.e., past and future entities. My doctoral dissertation pursues two main aims. The first one is to define precisely the central topic of temporal ontology, bringing to light its metaphysically substantial character in response to the recent deflationist arguments. The second aim is to offer a critical examination of the appeal to common sense within the debate on temporal ontology. With respect to this, I argue that presentism, despite being commonsensical, should not be considered as the default position in temporal ontology. Hence, I weigh up the prospects of presentism and B-theoretical eternalism with respect to three themes that are variously related to common sense: the feeling of relief subsequent to the ending of an unpleasant event, the undesirability of the tragically sorrowful events of the past history, and the libertarian conception of the freedom of the will. I argue that with respect to none of these themes presentism turns out to be preferable to B-theoretical eternalism.