The aim of the present study is to analyze the “giudizio direttissimo” – one of the different forms that criminal trials can take in Italy – from the perspective of the Italian Constitution. In this particular kind of trial, the accused is immediately brought before the Court to be publicly judged, without any kind of preliminary hearing to assess whether the charge is well-founded or not. On one hand, the “giudizio direttissimo” seems to be consistent with the principle – laid down in the Italian Constitution – that a trial must be held within a reasonable time of time. Indeed, the omission of the “preliminaries” – that characterize the “ordinary proceeding” – allows a saving of one year and a half, when compared to the average length of the latter. On the other hand, the course of this kind of trial, in some cases, doesn’t seem to give the accused enough time to prepare an adequate defence. Moreover, its discipline seems to be lacking in some of the most important constitutional rights. A constitutionally consistent interpretation of the “giudizio direttissimo” might help to solve the aforementioned issues, by limiting its application only to the easiest cases. In addition, some case-law which is too rigorous for the defendant should be overridden.
Il presente lavoro propone una disamina del giudizio direttissimo alla luce dei princìpi costituzionali. L’istituto in questione risponde ad un’esigenza di accelerazione procedimentale che trova, oggi, un espresso riconoscimento nell’art. 111 comma 2 della Carta fondamentale; nonché, in diverse altre sue disposizioni. Al contempo, le esigenze della celerità e della semplificazione hanno imposto soluzioni normative contrastanti con diversi princìpi costituzionali, dando luogo a contraddizioni tra le istanze di celerità e le esigenze di garanzia. Al fine di assicurare una piena conformità dell’istituto in oggetto con la Carta fondamentale, è opportuno privilegiare un’interpretazione il più possibile restrittiva delle condizioni normative che ne legittimano l’introduzione e tentare un’esegesi costituzionalmente orientata della disciplina concernente taluni aspetti dinamici.
Profili costituzionali del giudizio direttissimo
RUBERA, MATTEO TULLIO MARIA
2010
Abstract
The aim of the present study is to analyze the “giudizio direttissimo” – one of the different forms that criminal trials can take in Italy – from the perspective of the Italian Constitution. In this particular kind of trial, the accused is immediately brought before the Court to be publicly judged, without any kind of preliminary hearing to assess whether the charge is well-founded or not. On one hand, the “giudizio direttissimo” seems to be consistent with the principle – laid down in the Italian Constitution – that a trial must be held within a reasonable time of time. Indeed, the omission of the “preliminaries” – that characterize the “ordinary proceeding” – allows a saving of one year and a half, when compared to the average length of the latter. On the other hand, the course of this kind of trial, in some cases, doesn’t seem to give the accused enough time to prepare an adequate defence. Moreover, its discipline seems to be lacking in some of the most important constitutional rights. A constitutionally consistent interpretation of the “giudizio direttissimo” might help to solve the aforementioned issues, by limiting its application only to the easiest cases. In addition, some case-law which is too rigorous for the defendant should be overridden.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14242/195611
URN:NBN:IT:UNIROMA2-195611