From methodological solipsism to the extended mind: functionalisms, mechanisms and externalisms in cognitive sciences

Using comparisons as a strategy, I aim at offering a framework which include oppositions both tracked in cognitive sciences history as well as actual in current debates. Starting with James’s vs Fodor’s functionalism, then going through classical cognitive science vs second generation cognitive sciences, the thesis investigates the capacity of mechanistic philosophy to rethink and go beyond many radicalized dichotomies, simultaneously strengthening the connections with biological concerns. Instead of taking to extremes these oppositions, the main purpose of my work is, hence, tightly related to synthesis ambitions, following the leading aim of cognitive research. Trying to keep together tradition and innovation, scientific practise and philosophical methodology, discipline specificity and multidisciplinary cooperation, is a challenge that contemporary cognitive sciences and philosophy of mind are not only asked to deal with, but is also constitutive of their strength.