Pluralist Arguments and Institutional Justification

In this thesis, four main sections share the aim of mapping through the diversity and complexity of contemporary theories of pluralism – or pluralist arguments. Their outcome is meant to shed light on the implications of pluralist arguments within practical reasoning and especially in legal reasoning. The contention is that value pluralism is a phenomenon occurring across practical reason including politics and law. Therefore, political and especially legal pluralism may be ultimately recast in its light. I will aim at establishing a core of one necessary and two disjunctively sufficient conditions for a concept of value pluralism which makes its normative claims explicit. The second to last section is a pivot point regarding legal orders in situations of interdependence and overlap. Two complementary levels of engagements "macro" and "micro" will be gathered, highlighting the relevance of the latter. More specifically, a prospect is meant to become open: we will become able to assess the possibility of what will be called “interlegal balancing” as a sort of application of insights within and beyond contemporary contributions on the theory of legal principles and balancing, under the challenge of conflicts of norms sourced in different legal orders.