Coalition dynamics, voting strategies, and redistributive policies: theoretical and experimental perspectives

In contemporary economic-political systems, all economic agents, from policymakers to citizens, are called to make decisions that systematically impact institutional equilibria and policy outcomes. Political decision-makers must first be able to design effective policies that address the needs and preferences of citizens. In turn, citizens, recognizing the value of these proposals, elect representatives who can implement them effectively. Among these decisions are those related to redistributive policies, which regulate the trade-off between equity and efficiency. However, both policymakers and citizens often make their decisions under conditions of uncertainty. Limited information, shifting political landscapes, and unpredictable economic fluctuations contribute to the complexity of decision-making processes. In this context, strategic dynamics play a crucial role in shaping political competition, democratic representation, and the allocation of resources. Understanding these interactions is essential for analyzing the formation and stability of political coalitions, voter behavior under uncertain conditions, and the balance between equity and economic efficiency in policy design. Coalition formation is a critical area of study, since it examines how different parties align with one another to influence policy decisions, often in the pursuit of shared objectives. Coalitions can generally be classified into pre-electoral and post-electoral alliances. Although post-electoral coalitions are relatively stable and effective in governance, pre-electoral coalitions represent a particularly compelling case. By influencing electoral outcomes, they play a pivotal role in shaping strategic behavior and determining future political representation, ultimately setting the stage for policymaking and the power distribution within governing institutions. These pre-electoral coalitions profoundly affect voters’ behavior, creating tensions between ideological loyalty and the desire for effective government representation, often leading to strategic voting. Voting strategies are equally important, as they describe the decision-making processes by which individuals or groups choose to support specific policies, candidates, or coalitions. These strategies often reflect voters’ preferences given the available information and play a pivotal role in determining candidates’ eligibility. Finally, redistributive policies are a central concern of economic and political systems, aiming to reduce inequality and distribute resources more equitably among society’s members. However, such policies often come with a tradeoff: while they promote equity, they may reduce economic efficiency and alter individuals’ incentives to work, save, and invest. Therefore, this thesis consists of three distinct chapters that sequentially explore the complex dynamics of pre-electoral coalition formation (Chapter 1), voting strategies (Chapter 1 and Chapter 2), and redistributive choices (Chapter 3). This exploration is carried out through a combination of theoretical and experimental approaches, providing a comprehensive analysis of the behavioral conduct and the strategic interactions that shape political and economic outcomes. Specifically, the first chapter is a purely theoretical study that investigates the bargaining dynamics of pre-electoral coalitions and their influence on voting strategies. Differently, the second and third chapters present two theory-driven experiments that empirically examine strategic decision-making under different types of electoral ambiguity (the second) and redistributive choices under different types of taxation (the third). Below, I briefly outline the contents of these three chapters. Chapter 1 – “The dynamics of Pre-Electoral Coalitions on Voting Strategies”, co-authored with Michela Chessa (University of Côte d’Azur) – examines from a theoretical perspective the decision-making process of candidates in forming pre-electoral coalitions, and its impact on the subsequent voters’ choices under the plurality system. It is a generalization of the model proposed by Shin (2019), with the introduction of a centrist candidate, next to two left-wing candidates and one right-wing candidate. In this model, pre-electoral opinion polls and ideological distances matter and play a fundamental role in defining the best strategies for both candidates and voters. Using a sequential game framework, it is found that only when opinion polls are disclosed: (i.) strategic voting arises, as voters maximize expected utility by supporting the most viable candidate while considering ideological proximity, benefiting the centrist the most; (ii.) candidates enter in a pre-electoral coalition bargaining only if (ii.a) forming a coalition provides higher expected utility than running individually, and (ii.b) the comparative advantage of being in that coalition holds across all potential coalitions. Chapter 2 – “More ambiguity, more sincere voting? Evidence on the neglected role of primary elections”, co-authored with Giuseppe Attanasi (Sapienza University of Rome), Etienne Farvaque (University of Lille, CNRS), Yoichi Hizen (Kochi University of Technology), and Yoshio Kamijo (Waseda University) – investigates how two different types of ambiguity, preference and outcome, influence voters’ behavior during primary elections. Building on the model proposed by Bouton et al. (2017), which is assumed to be the preliminary stage of a primary election with ambiguity about the preference distribution, the framework is extended to include a second stage simulating general elections. This addition introduces outcome ambiguity, providing a more comprehensive representation of real-world electoral dynamics. Through a theory-driven experiment, which includes a cross-country comparison between Italy and Japan, it is analyzed how voters adapt their voting strategies under varying configurations of ambiguity. It is shown that increasing levels of ambiguity foster convergence toward a sincere voting equilibrium, wherein voters prioritize ideological alignment over strategic considerations, and are only marginally influenced by cultural and institutional factors. Chapter 3 – “Equity or Efficiency: An Experimental Investigation”, co-authored with Daniela Di Cagno (LUISS University of Rome) and Luca Panaccione (Sapienza University of Rome) – contributes to the broader debate on the equity-efficiency tradeoff by examining how individuals perceive and respond to it through a theory-driven experiment. Participants, engaged in a dyadic proposer-responder interaction, are tasked with redistributing an income between themselves and an anonymous counterpart while we manipulate levels of efficiency loss and the responder’s veto power. Our findings reveal that: (i.) efficiency-seeking behavior increases as the equity-efficiency tradeoff worsens, with the extent of this shift varying across game types; (ii.) equity-seeking behavior increases with the responder’s veto power; (iii.) despite efficiency loss and veto power, individuals’ equity preferences remain stable. These three chapters, while addressing different issues, share a common approach to investigating strategic choices and their implications for political and economic outcomes. The joint analysis of these phenomena allows us to better understand the dynamics of political representation in democratic systems and their management in resource redistribution.