Problemi attuali dell'autonomia procedurale

Civil procedure and European Union law have long been regarded as distinct fields, with little or no real connection between them. This separation can be explained by the fact that procedural issues in EU law were traditionally considered through the lenses of private international law and transnational procedural law. At the turn of the twenty-first century, however, the European Union launched an intense process of legislative harmonisation. Once the harmonization of substantive law had begun, it became inevitable that certain national procedural rules would be confronted with the fundamental principles of EU law, in particular the primacy of EU law over national legal orders. The Court of Justice of the European Union has consistently emphasised the importance of the principle of procedural autonomy of the Member States, holding that it cannot impose uniform procedural rules, both because of the absence of adequate legal instruments and the cultural specificities of the twenty-seven Member States. Yet, this autonomy is not absolute, since it is limited by the principles of effectiveness and equivalence. Thus, whenever a national rule prevents the effective application of EU law, the Court may require the national judge to disapply it. Although these principles have a legitimate rationale, over the past twenty years they have been increasingly instrumentalised. This thesis seeks to demonstrate that the procedural autonomy of the Member States – particularly in Italy and France – is today in crisis. The growing influence of the CJEU’s case law – operating almost as a form of ius superveniens – forces national courts to adopt solutions often difficult to reconcile with their own legal traditions. The study begins with a historical reconstruction of civil procedure, highlighting its connection with the construction of the rule of law. A strong and independent judiciary has always been an essential condition for a strong state and for maintaining the balance between legislative and executive powers. The European Union, though not a political federation, now pursues a similar aim: it is increasingly structured as a unified judicial entity. The analysis then turns to the central instrument of the CJEU’s authority: the preliminary ruling procedure. This mechanism is no longer used solely to resolve questions of substantive EU law, but also to address issues of national procedural and judicial law. The second chapter examines several key judgments that paved the way for more intrusive interventions by the Court. With regard to res judicata, the Fininvest and SPV Project cases illustrate how the CJEU has interpreted and limited the stability of national final judgments by invoking the primacy of EU law, even in disputes not directly involving EU law. Particular attention is given to the SPV Project ruling, which triggered wide debate in Italian, French, and German scholarship, espe¬cially regarding its implications for injunction proceedings and the limits of judicial review in cases of unfair terms. Another important decision – though not directly a breach of procedural autonomy – offers insights into the relationship between courts and the role assigned by nation¬al jurisdictions, both ordinary and special (such as the Corte di cassazione and the Consiglio di Stato), to preliminary references. As the Randstad case shows, the mechanism may even be used to resolve conflicts between domestic jurisdictions, thereby playing a coordinating role within the national legal order. Finally, the third chapter explores possible ways forward. In particular, it considers the role of constitutional courts and their interaction with the CJEU. The controlimiti doctrine developed by some constitutional courts to safeguard the fundamental principles of their con¬stitutions, now appears increasingly difficult to apply in the face of the expanding reach of EU law. What perspectives, then, lie ahead? Any effective solution first requires a full understand¬ing of the phenomenon and the uncertainties it generates within national procedural systems. Only then will it be possible to open a genuine debate on the need for a European legislative intervention better defining the limits of EU competence in procedural matters.