PUBLIC OPINION TOWARDS TECHNOCRACY: ATTITUDES, PREFERENCES AND VOTING BEHAVIOR

This dissertation investigates public opinion toward technocratic governance and its compatibility with liberal representative democracy. While technocracy and democracy are often portrayed as conceptually opposed—one grounded in expertise, the other in popular sovereignty—empirical developments across Europe reveal more hybrid configurations. From the growing reliance on experts by institutions like the EU to the appointment of technocratic executives in parliamentary systems, contemporary democracies routinely incorporate technocratic practices. Against this backdrop, the dissertation asks: how do citizens make sense of these hybrid arrangements when forming political preferences? Does support for expert-led governance reflect disillusionment with democracy, or a reconfiguration of its normative foundations? Adopting a demand-side perspective, the dissertation explores whether technocratic attitudes signal a rejection of democratic norms or a reinterpretation of them. It argues that citizens do not necessarily see technocracy and democracy as mutually exclusive. Rather, support for technocratic governance often emerges as a response to perceived failures of party-based politics, particularly during crises. The first empirical chapter uses the 2021 SOLID survey, covering 16 EU member states, to examine the distribution and structure of technocratic attitudes across Europe. Contrary to earlier claims about the existence of a distinct technocratic public (Bertsou & Caramani, 2020a), the analysis finds no evidence of a cohesive “technocratic” attitudinal profile. Instead, technocratic orientations often overlap with populist attitudes and dissatisfaction with elites. This hybridity—often referred to as “technopopulism”—suggests that support for expert-led governance is less about technocratic values per se and more about disaffection with representative institutions. Significant cross-national variation further underscores the contextual nature of public opinion toward technocracy. The second chapter narrows the focus to Italy, a country with a unique record of alternating between party-based, populist, and technocratic governments. Using a forced-choice conjoint experiment during the 2022 energy crisis, it investigates voter preferences for technocratic versus political ministers. Results reveal a consistent preference for technocratic profiles, especially among younger, highly educated, and institutionally trusting respondents. This suggests that technocracy enjoys public legitimacy during crises—not as a rejection of democracy, but as a corrective to its perceived limitations. However, support for technocrats is strongest among those who already trust institutions, raising questions about technocracy’s potential to rebuild wider legitimacy. The third chapter analyzes accountability under technocratic rule by examining Italian voting behavior between 2019 and 2022. Findings suggest that technocratic rule reframes, rather than neutralizes, democratic accountability: voters reward or punish parties based on their support for the technocratic executive. Accountability remains possible but becomes indirect, shaped by party positioning and crisis context. Overall, the dissertation shows that technocracy and democracy are not inherently incompatible. Their relationship is shaped by institutions, trust, crises, and party dynamics. Combining cross-national and case-specific analysis, it offers new insights into how citizens perceive and respond to technocratic governance in Europe.