CONTROLLED AND AUTOMATIC PROCESSES IN MORAL DECISION-MAKING

A popular dual-process theory of moral decision-making, that put forward by Joshua Greene, proposes that deontological judgments are produced by affective intuitions while consequentialist judgements usually are the product of cognitive deliberation. Greene and colleagues (2001, 2004) have backed up this claim with empirical evidence coming from fMRI studies, cognitive load studies, and pathology. Greene (2008, 2014, 2017) has used this evidence to propose two normative derivations, the direct and indirect route, about deontological moral judgments. The arguments aim to show that, given their origin in affective and intuitive processes, deontological judgments led us astray in many modern moral problems, and in many philosophical problems like the famous trolley problem or Peter Singer’s (1972) problem on the moral effect of spatial distance. In this thesis I attempt to flesh out a criticism against some aspects of Greene’s dual-process model and to propose a new theory, by disentangling some theoretical classifications (intuition-deliberation, emotioncognition, deontology-consequentialism) that, in Greene’s theory, are mapped one upon the other. I argue that the emotion-cognition distinction is not a useful theoretical tool; and I follow the theories of the education of moral intuitions proposed by Jillian Craigie (2011), Hanno Sauer (2012a), Richmond Campbell and Viktor Kumar (2012) in positing a diachronic effect of deliberation over intuitions. I propose that the education of intuitions in the moral sphere is best characterized as a process of skill acquisition rather than habitualization, as this better accounts for its automatic yet rational nature (Christensen, Sutton and McIlwain, 2016; Stichter, 2018). Following an intuition by Peter Railton (2014), I provide a defense of deontological judgments from the normative claims of Greene’s theory, and I offer a more balanced view of the role of intuition within moral decisionmaking, providing a reinterpretation of the role it plays in Haidt’s Twin Problem, in the trolley dilemma, and in Singer’s Puzzle. My reinterpretation is centered on the capacity of intuition to react to the general story proposed by these problems rather than on specific factors. Thus, I argue that intuition is much more nuanced and indeed necessary in morality. My own positive theory is centered around the notion that moral judgments might proceed from self-centered thoughts and feelings or from other-centered ones. I propose that broadly agreed upon judgments are those which find a balance between these two extremes, while deliberation is needed to reach more extreme and less common judgments. Finally, following a model by Kahane and colleagues (2018), I advance the hypothesis that consequentialist judgments might be perceived as more uncommon than deontological ones.