Virtues of the Passions in Albert the Great: Aristotelian Ethics and Biblical Imagery

The dissertation deals with a series of interconnected themes in Albert the Great’s (1200 ca.-1280) moral thought by bringing together his ethical works and his biblical commentaries, with a special focus on the commentaries on the Synoptic Gospels and on the Book of Job. Bridging the gap between Albert’s philosophical ethics and his interpretations of scriptural images and stories, other than being promising from a historical and critical point of view, also allows us to engage in the various moral questions we will address with the vividness and expressive power that very rarely are to be found in merely theoretical analyses. The dissertation comprises four chapters. Chapter 1 details Albert’s understanding of Aristotle’s definition of moral virtue as a habit that strives for the right mean of passions and actions. First, I investigate the Dominican’s theory of habit, and then go on to analyze his philologically accurate and philosophically stimulating reading of the famous “doctrine of the mean”. His conclusions, I hope, will prove to be relevant also for contemporary debates on this crucial aspect of the "Nicomachean Ethics"’s legacy. Chapter 2 revolves around the question of the gradation of virtue. After surveying Albert’s sources on the topic, I reconstruct his conception of the levels of virtue that surpass the moral one, that is, heroic virtue ("virtus heroica") and divine virtue ("virtus divina"), laying particular stress on the relationship between these habitual dispositions and the passions. Again, I hope that my analysis, which is chiefly historical and textual, will appeal also to theoretically oriented moral philosophers, especially to those interested in the notion of supererogation. Chapter 3 marks the transition from the discussion of virtue in general to that of particular virtues. In chapter 3, I turn to Albert’s account of the virtue that is concerned with the passion of concupiscible pleasure, namely, temperance. I approach this subject matter gradually, placing it first within the framework of the workings of human desire. I then focus on Albert’s multi-faceted view of temperance and pleasure, giving prominence to a key moment of his exegesis of the Book of Job. Finally, chapter 4 tackles Albert’s account of the virtue that is concerned with the passions of fear and pain, namely, fortitude. I accentuate the Dominican’s indebtedness to the Aristotelian discourse on courage and demonstrate that the careful consideration of this discourse and of its reworking by the Universal Doctor can significantly deepen our appreciation of his attempt to grapple with the suffering of Job. Overall, through the inquiry into these two special virtues and their representations, chapters 3 and 4 testify to the fundamental thesis that, like a red thread, runs across the whole dissertation: Albert’s commitment to the idea of the centrality and legitimacy of the passions at all levels of the moral life.