The effective governance of Italy's National Recovery and Resilience Plan (PNRR) mandates robust oversight, yet literature lacks empirical studies on the internal impact of digital monitoring systems within public administrations. This thesis addresses that gap by conducting a qualitative single-case study of the Internal Monitoring System (SMI) in the Municipality of Rome's PNRR Department to establish the causal mechanisms that influence its performance. The study employed an integrated methodological approach, utilizing pattern matching to synthesize findings across the three theoretical domains: M&E, Digital Governance, and Organizational Behavior. The analysis established that the SMI's impact is fundamentally bimodal, exhibiting a critical Efficiency-Effectiveness Trade-Off. The system achieved high Effectiveness by enforcing data standardization and providing a verifiable platform for Upward Accountability, successfully meeting the legal mandate for PNRR compliance. However, it suffered from low Internal Operational Efficiency, a deficit causally linked to a Digital Governance failure: the Interoperability Barrier with other systems. This flaw generated mandatory double work for Project Managers (RUPs), which fueled predictable rational organizational resistance. The thesis concludes that the system’s design represents a strategic trade-off where the Principal (PNRR Department) prioritized the strategic necessity of External Accountability over the operational goal of Internal Efficiency. This research contributes to academic theory by empirically validating this causal model within the PNRR context, providing insights into why digital transformation in compliance-driven public sectors accepts internal costs to secure strategic external success.
The impact of an internal monitoring and evaluation system on public project performance: a case study of the Municipality of Rome's PNRR initiatives.
KHODAEI, SEYED HOSSEIN
2026
Abstract
The effective governance of Italy's National Recovery and Resilience Plan (PNRR) mandates robust oversight, yet literature lacks empirical studies on the internal impact of digital monitoring systems within public administrations. This thesis addresses that gap by conducting a qualitative single-case study of the Internal Monitoring System (SMI) in the Municipality of Rome's PNRR Department to establish the causal mechanisms that influence its performance. The study employed an integrated methodological approach, utilizing pattern matching to synthesize findings across the three theoretical domains: M&E, Digital Governance, and Organizational Behavior. The analysis established that the SMI's impact is fundamentally bimodal, exhibiting a critical Efficiency-Effectiveness Trade-Off. The system achieved high Effectiveness by enforcing data standardization and providing a verifiable platform for Upward Accountability, successfully meeting the legal mandate for PNRR compliance. However, it suffered from low Internal Operational Efficiency, a deficit causally linked to a Digital Governance failure: the Interoperability Barrier with other systems. This flaw generated mandatory double work for Project Managers (RUPs), which fueled predictable rational organizational resistance. The thesis concludes that the system’s design represents a strategic trade-off where the Principal (PNRR Department) prioritized the strategic necessity of External Accountability over the operational goal of Internal Efficiency. This research contributes to academic theory by empirically validating this causal model within the PNRR context, providing insights into why digital transformation in compliance-driven public sectors accepts internal costs to secure strategic external success.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14242/372441
URN:NBN:IT:UNIROMA1-372441