MORAL AGENCY, RELATIONALITY AND NORMATIVITY STARTING FROM G.E.M. ANSCOMBE

The goal of this dissertation is to analyse the role relationality plays in moral agency, starting from the Wartime Quartet and, particularly, from G.E.M. Anscombe’s philosophy. The aim is to see whether, thanks to Anscombe's philosophical method, it is possible to gain a broader understanding of the concept of relationality to argue in favour of its normative role within the moral life of the subject. The dissertation is articulated in four chapters. The first chapter is devoted to the role of women philosophers in the history of analytic philosophy, with specific reference to the Wartime Quartet, through a review of recent literature on the subject, which gives rise to a “heterodox perspective” on analytical philosophy, showing a substantial interest in historical-philosophical reconstruction. The second chapter focuses on Anscombe’s biography and intellectual background, with aiming at reviewing the literature and highlighting the importance of the biography in the author’s philosophical output. The third one discusses Anscombe’s work, especially her ethical writings, in particular Intention, On Brute Facts, and Modern Moral Philosophy, aiming at acquiring the philosophical tools to investigate the notion of relationality and broaden its understanding. My hypothesis is that Anscombe’s work allows for a twofold level at which relationality can be understood. The former is related to the structure of the concept of relationality, its grammar, and how it operates in linguistic practices, while the latter concerns relationality as a dialogical practice that directly involves human beings, becoming an important element in the context of the institutions in which they act and inhabit. The dialogical feature aims at emphasising the complex network of relationships that are at stake when human beings interact with each other: this complexity is articulated both in their daily encounters and in the way their linguistic descriptions are related to each other and to the reality they aim at describing. Following this, the fourth chapter is devoted to the concept of relationality by engaging with a selection of Anscombe’s philosophical works. The point is to investigate the meaning of moral psychology Anscombe advocates for, to discuss the normative role of relationality in the moral life of the agent, and the risks of relationality itself – pictured in the notion of shadow-implications. Finally, I aim at proposing a relational approach to moral agency, by starting a dialogue between the conceptual framework of the ethics of care with particular reference to Elena Pulcini and Anscombean conceptual tools.