Pluralism and Diversity: For the Sake of Equal Respect

The dissertation addresses the issue of pluralism in liberal political theory and within a liberal political community. It challenges political liberalism’s focus solely on the essentially political level – that is on the justification of the exercise of political power under the conditions of pluralism –, as it overlooks other manifestations of pluralism equally important for a liberal political community. That concerns the so-called societal level as another formative level of a liberal political community characterized mainly by the differences among people due to their membership in diverse groups. One of the consequences of such a limited focus is that although political power is justified to citizens, still many them may feel being treated unfairly within a liberal political community. Since the author argues that the objective of the justification of political power is primarily to ensure equal respect, the possibility of having some people disrespected within a liberal political community is problematic for political liberalism. Accordingly, the objective of the dissertation is to find out the way to cover both spheres forming the public sphere of a liberal political community. By using the argumentation of political (public reason) liberalism, it aims to come to such an understanding of respect that would embrace both the essentially political and societal levels of a liberal political community. The author turns to the criterion of reciprocity – as the basis of political legitimacy and the principle underlying the whole project of political liberalism – and calls for its dual interpretation: the criterion of reciprocity is explained not only by means of the imperative of respect, but also by means of the idea of civic friendship. The role of the criterion of reciprocity interpreted by means of civic friendship is that it retrospectively influences the very character of respect. This is because civic friendship inherently shifts the understanding of the character of respect from the third-person imperative to the second-person act of recognition. This way, the argument from civic friendship allows to achieve respect both at the essentially political and societal levels of a liberal political community.