PLURALISM AS IT IS, PLURALISM AS IT SHOULD BE. A CASE FOR MODUS VIVENDI

Pluralism is an inescapable feature of contemporary liberal societies and it raises the demand for a normative strategy to face the disagreement it generates. Contemporary debates in normative political theory deal with pluralism by proposing a variety of solutions to prevent it from degenerating into unmanageable conflicts. The most prominent and dominant theoretical paradigm is John Rawls’s theory of political liberalism, that dissolves the dangerous potential of political disagreement by imposing a discipline of pluralism. This work is guided by the question: is there a way to govern the undesirable consequences of pluralism that does not imply a disciplining of pluralism itself? The goal is to find a solution to the problem of pluralism, a strategy for its management able to preserve its features without putting order, peace and stability at risk. Along with modus vivendi scholars and contrary to the Rawls outlook on modus vivendi, this work is committed to show that modus vivendi contains the potential to give an answer to the pluralism of beliefs and not just to the plurality of goals. Modus vivendi is here regarded as an independent political project, capable of providing an answer to pluralism whilst representing a valuable alternative to political liberalism. I commence my analysis challenging the Rawlsian paradigm of political liberalism, starting with an assessment of his version of pluralism, reasonable pluralism, and of what I call the “tools” that political liberalism puts in place to contain the effects of reasonable pluralism and to attain a form of strong and enduring consensus. I then turn to the appraisal of modus vivendi solutions. I define the Rawlsian understanding of modus vivendi (which I called “Rawlsian modus vivendi”, RMV) as the black mirror of political liberalism since it is entirely thought out to perform an ancillary role with respect to the purposes of it. The pars construens on this work is dedicated to the project of re-thinking modus vivendi along the dynamics of compromise, a model that I call “compromise modus vivendi” (CMV). I argue that CMV should fall within the scope of non-ideal realist political theory and that it is normative as it demands that citizens have an attitude to compromise, specified by a list of requirements. I observe how the dynamics of CMV result in a specific form of consensus that does not require any selection of reasons and a specific form of stability (light stability) that mirrors such openness to plural reasons. I conclude that CMV has the virtue of being a desirable and practicable solution while respecting pluralism in its actual form.