IL FINANZIAMENTO ALLE IMPRESE IN CRISI

The subject of the analysis relates the liabilities against the banks arising from the lending to companies in economic distress or default ("concessione abusiva di credito"). Traditional doctrines, from France and Belgium, affirmed that the bank should be considered liable for the damages caused to the creditors of the company. This claim is based on the principle of entrust and deceptive appearance: the creditor negotiates with the company, and trusts the company's solvency, because the bank funded (and keeps on founding) it. Italian courts (see also Cassazione Sezioni Unite 7029-7030-7031/2006) followed the above mentioned interpretation, but determined that the creditor's claim is personal: the bank cannot be sued by the official receiver ("curatore fallimentare"). As a consequence of the above, banks are actually immune from any claim: single creditors do not have the power and information needed to prove the liability. “Concessione abusive del credito”, under this interpretation, is a rigid and limited tort. Some Authors suggested that the banks, in case of negligent lending, can be considered as shadow directors - interfering in the company's decisions - and can be sued by the official receiver ("curatore fallimentare") for the damages caused to the company itself. This analysis explores another solution, resulting from recent studies in Germany (H. KÖTZ, Vertragsrecht, Tübingen, 2009) and Italy (C. MIGLIO, L’autonomia privata nel rapporto di finanziamento bancario, Giust. Civ. 2013, 9, p. 473). Briefly, under this different interpretation, the bank's loan granted to companies defaulted and/or in distress, should be considered void. This different solution considers the “concessione abusive di credito” a threat to economic public order, generating negative externalities. Italian Constitution states that economic initiatives (“iniziativa economica”) cannot be contrary to public social utility (art. 41 co 2) – and bank law declares that the bank is obliged to a safe and prudent lending (art. 5 T.U.B.). As a consequence of the above mentioned second interpretation, the banks lose every guarantee, mortgage and surety securing the relevant loans; furthermore the banks can be sued by “curatore fallimentare” for precontractual liability (art. 1338 c.c.): if someone does not disclose the voidness of a contract (that he knows or should know that it is void) the other part shall be compensated of the relevant damages suffered. The last step of the analysis regards loan agreements executed in the framework of a restructuring procedure. Italian bankruptcy law has developed in the last 10 years three different restructuring procedures: “piani di risanamento” (art. 67 l.fall.), “concordato preventivo” (art. 160 l.fall.) and “accordi di ristrutturazione dei debiti” (art. 182-bis l.fall.). According to the prevailing doctrine, in the context of a restructuring procedure, the bank cannot be considered liable of “concessione abousiva di credito”: the relevant loan agreement is promoted and fostered by Italian law. But under an economic analysis of such law, a “no liability” rule is inefficient: the bank could avoid any credit rating and investigation on the condition of the company, allocating the default risk on the other creditors. We suggest that Italian law’s “favor” should be valued in considering bank’s malice or negligence. Only when the lender knows (or should have known) that the turnaround plan was inconsistent, he should be asked for compensation by the creditors. In this perimeter, the contract should be usually considered enforceable: Italian law encourages lending during the turnaround procedures – the contract is not contrasting economic public order, but it can be the base of a compensation plea.