There is no consensus on what causes inequality and increasing concentration of earnings at the top in labour markets. In this thesis, we review the literature concerning this issue and find out that two contrasting theories exist: market-based theories and institutions-based theories. But, since neither has been fully validated by the empirical evidence, we suggest that they should rather be seen as two complementary explanations of the increase in top labour earnings. In this context, we study two categories of Italian workers, known to be characterized by the presence of “working super-rich”: licensed liberal professionals and managers. In the first case, our results might be interpreted as evidence in support of rent extraction, even if the methodology we apply do not allow us to fully identify a causal nexus about the determinants of top earnings. In the second case, we find that both performance and power have a role in determining the compensation of listed firms’ directors and managers, although we do not find conclusive evidence on which driver prevails.

Essays on top incomes in labour market

Palomba, Gabriele
2023

Abstract

There is no consensus on what causes inequality and increasing concentration of earnings at the top in labour markets. In this thesis, we review the literature concerning this issue and find out that two contrasting theories exist: market-based theories and institutions-based theories. But, since neither has been fully validated by the empirical evidence, we suggest that they should rather be seen as two complementary explanations of the increase in top labour earnings. In this context, we study two categories of Italian workers, known to be characterized by the presence of “working super-rich”: licensed liberal professionals and managers. In the first case, our results might be interpreted as evidence in support of rent extraction, even if the methodology we apply do not allow us to fully identify a causal nexus about the determinants of top earnings. In the second case, we find that both performance and power have a role in determining the compensation of listed firms’ directors and managers, although we do not find conclusive evidence on which driver prevails.
14-apr-2023
Inglese
RAITANO, Michele
TANCIONI, MASSIMILIANO
Università degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza"
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14242/99831
Il codice NBN di questa tesi è URN:NBN:IT:UNIROMA1-99831